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SUMMARY 
Tamil Nadu enjoyed high rates of growth both before and after liberalisation due to 
a combination of factors that allowed its two main political parties to create and 
allocate rents in ways that enhanced productivity and competitiveness. Tamil Nadu’s 
populist redistributive politics has its roots in a nativist ideology. The competitive 
clientelism in the state keeps within the bounds of broadly ‘live and let live’ 
strategies because both parties share a common ideology and mobilize almost 
identical social groups. The result is a form of competitive clientelism that achieves a 
cycling in and out of the two parties in successive elections. The paradox of Tamil 
political economy is that despite its competitive clientelism, it remains one of India’s 
most industrially advanced states. We argue that while their common ideological 
history appears to make the competition between the two parties intense, their 
common ideological ancestry and the similarity of their constituencies means they 
do not have widely divergent policies. Their rent creation strategies included support 
for industrialisation and these strategies remained stable despite parties cycling in 
and out of paper, allowing a steady rise in industrial investment and capability 
development. 
The challenge for Tamil Nadu is to sustain its industrial growth as political 
competition leads to the risk of its two party system fragmenting and even the 
possibility of increasing violence affecting stability. We focus on the state’s auto 
component manufacturers who grew under India’s former dirigiste regime by 
establishing links with the ruling parties and continued to grow after liberalization by 
upgrading productive capabilities. This required policies to promote learning and 
technological upgrading and entrepreneurs played a proactive role in driving this 
industrialisation. Tamil Nadu’s experience shows that capability development 
strategies for manufacturing are possible in the context of competitive clientelism.  
6.1 Introduction 
Tamil Nadu (Figure 6.1) along with Maharashtra and Gujarat is one of India’s top 
three states in terms of economic performance. It was formed in 1950 and was once 
part of the erstwhile British province called the Madras Presidency. Even at the time 
of India’s independence Tamil Nadu had a well defined ‘national’ identity based on a 
culture distinct from the rest of India. This identity still plays a part in the politics of 
the state. The state’s highly mobilized and competitive politics is based around a 
nativist ideology promoted by political leaders who have been ‘stars’ in the state’s 
thriving film industry. Anecdotally, the state is also known to be one of the more 
corrupt of the larger states in India. Given this profile one would not expect this state 
to be one of India’s best performing states in terms of economic performance. In 
terms of its HDI it equals Gujarat and betters it in terms of attracting FDI. As in the 
Gujarat chapter, we discuss how the ruling coalition was constructed in Tamil Nadu 
and the types of rents it used as a survival strategy, which consequently impacted 
investment and technology adoption strategies in the state. 
Tamil Nadu’s fragmented political organizations are typical of the competitive 
clientelist variant of patron-client politics described in Chapter two. The state’s 
political settlement has evolved into one where two large parties cycle in and out of 
power in successive elections. The party that wins has also done so with a substantial 
majority since 1989. The avoidance of political logjams due to disputed elections and 
the emergence of a ‘live and let live’ policy between the ruling coalition and 
opposition organizations have contributed to high levels of growth. These features 
make Tamil Nadu untypical as a competitive clientelist polity. The configuration of 
power and the allocation of rents that contributes to this are therefore of significant 
interest, with implications for other developing countries. Indeed understanding 
these processes may be very useful for identifying vulnerabilities in Tamil Nadu’s 
own growth strategy in the future. Whichever party is in power, the management of 
a large industrial investment is looked upon as a channel through which to create 
rents for political parties and key individuals within the parties. The assurance of 
cycling reduces the incentives for the opposition to block these investments or to 
overturn them when they come to power. At the same time the fact that this cycle 
has continued since 1989 without the incumbent reneging on any large industrial 
investment negotiated by the previous government seems to have provided 
investors with the confidence that their property rights will be protected. This is one 
of the reasons why the state sees a high level of industrial investments despite the 
clientelistic nature of the political settlement. The configuration of power that allows 
a cycling in and out of two alternative ruling coalitions has not just led to high 
investments but also affected the kinds of technologies the state has acquired and 
strategies of capability development. This is particularly interesting because the link 
between competitive patron-client politics and reasonably well-working government 
agencies dealing with critical market failures to support a growing business sector is 
rare in other developing countries and regions within India. What then were the 
critical features of Tamil Nadu society, politics and institutional structures that help 
to explain the emergence of these arrangements? Specifically, what institutional or 
political factors allow relative policy stability in a context of clientelist cycling? 
 Figure 6.1.  Tamil Nadu—one of India’s southern-most state 
Source: 
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:India_Tamil_Nadu_locator_map.svg 
 
Our focus on political settlements brings to the fore the organization and distribution 
of power between the major groups and class organizations in Tamil Nadu, and how 
this affected the efficacy and sustainability of different growth strategies. What 
makes Tamil Nadu especially interesting is that the two main parties, the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazagham or DMK (Dravidian Progress Federation) and a later offshoot 
the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazagham or AIADMK (All India Anna Dravidian 
Progress Federation) have roots in the same decidedly anti-North Indian, anti-
Brahmin movement, which in its early stages was also a Rationalist movement. 
Brahmin is the highest ‘caste’ in Sanskritic Hinduism and its members have 
historically been implicated in the suppression of lower castes. Caste identities still 
have deep resonance in Indian electoral politics. Approximately three per cent of 
Tamil Nadu’s population is Brahmin while almost two-thirds are ‘backward castes’ 
(Wyatt 2002). While backward castes in Tamil Nadu have historically been 
subservient to the minority Brahmins the social order saw significant changes from 
the early 20th century and specifically from the 1960s, with significant mobilizations 
by lower castes and episodes of anti-Brahmin violence. These movements led to the 
rise of the DMK and AIADMK which came to power as backward caste parties. 
Neither party could ideologically wipe out the other given the similarities in their 
ideological positions and the relatively small differences between them. This actually 
helped to moderate the intense competition for rents between these political 
organizations by ensuring that the party in power did not have the legitimacy to take 
the battle against the opposition too far. The rivalry between the two parties was 
therefore focused on the redistribution of largesse to similar constituencies 
(Ambirajan 1999; Subramanian 1999).  
This does not mean that political competition in Tamil Nadu is always peaceful. The 
state frequently witnesses violence between competing segments of the backward 
castes. Tamil Nadu has the inglorious reputation of witnessing a high degree of 
violence against ‘Dalits’, the caste group supposedly below the Hindu caste system 
and therefore the lowest strata in this ideological system who are often the poorest 
groups in society. Ironically this violence is often perpetrated by groups belonging 
officially to the Most Backward Caste (MBCs) denomination in India which is 
designated just above the Dalits. These conflicts are directly driven by the 
competition over rents. Dalit mobilization has often posed a threat to the privileges 
of the MBCs apportioned under affirmative action programmes for disadvantaged 
castes. In particular, the Indian government uses ‘Reservations’ to protect a fixed 
share of public sector jobs for particular backward castes. The mobilization of new 
groups demanding reservations threatens the share of existing groups.  
However Tamil Nadu’s Dalits are a more significant proportion of its population 
compared to Gujarat’s Muslims. In Gujarat Muslims are just less than 10 per cent of 
the population. The percentage of Dalits in Tamil Nadu’s population is double that at 
20 per cent and have the holding power to pose a credible threat to any ruling 
coalition that excludes them or uses force to repress them. As a result, violence 
against them from any quarter is not welcomed by the leadership of political parties, 
though sporadic and sometimes serious violence does take place against the Dalits, 
as a segment of the MBCs is a major constituency for the AIADMK. But both parties 
remain culpable with the violence usually perpetrated by Backward Caste leaders 
from the two main Dravidian parties contesting the gradually growing material 
power of sections of the Dalit community. However, the ‘growing’ power of the 
latter is relative and has to be seen in the context of the historically abject socio-
economic position of the Dalit community. Yet the politics behind the violence in 
Tamil Nadu is also quite different from that underpinning the violence in Gujarat. 
While violence of any kind is unacceptable what one observes in Tamil Nadu is a 
conflict between groups in the lower strata of society whereas violence in Gujarat is 
‘informally institutionalized’ and indirectly supported by the Hindutva ideology of 
the ruling party as we have described in Chapter Four. Tamil Nadu has never 
witnessed violence on the scale of the Gujarat riots of 2002. Violence here is the 
outcome of competitive strategies to establish relative power of evenly balanced 
groups contesting the distribution of rents. This is a commonly observed feature of 
contests over the distribution of benefits in clientelist political settlements (Khan 
2010, 2012). In Gujarat the violence against Muslims was not directly driven by 
competition over the relative distribution of rents. Rather, violence was unleashed 
against a much weaker group in society precisely because it would not be able to 
retaliate, allowing the ruling party to signal its control over violence that helped it to 
consolidate ‘authoritarian clientelism’ as discussed in Chapter Five. 
 
Population 2011 72.14 million  
(India 1.24 billion) 
Gross State Domestic Product 
2011-12 at current prices 
USD 104.6 billion 
Per capita Net State Domestic 
Product at current prices 2010-11 
USD 1640  
(India USD 1509) 
Capita Output Ratio 2012      2.25  
(India 2.32) 
Gross Fixed Capital Investment 
2011 % GDP  2004-05 prices 
19.8% 
(India 32%) 
Net Value Added Factory Sector 
2009-10 
USD 12.9 billion 
Share in All India Employment 
1980-81 to 2007-08 
13.1% 
Percentage of population below 
poverty line (2011-12)  
11.2% 
 (India 21.92%) 
 
Table 6.1. Tamil Nadu Economic Characteristics 
Source: Various (GoI Census 2011), (MoSPI), (CSO, Respective State Governments), 
(ASI, 2009-10), (NSSO 66th round), (Planning Commission of India) 
 
 Along with Maharashtra and Gujarat Tamil Nadu is one the leading industrial states 
of India, one of its three automotive manufacturing hubs (along with Pune in 
Maharashtra and the National Capital Region around New Delhi) and was ranked 
fourth in terms of attracting FDI between 2000 and 2012 (Figure 6.3). While 
Maharashtra and Delhi historically attracted over 50 per cent of FDI flows in India 
Karnataka was also attractive for high quality IT-related investments around 
Bangalore, which had emerged as a global IT hub. Though the FDI figure for TN over 
this period is relatively low (USD 9.72 billion) its position in fourth position remained 
consistent. The FDI it received was also in manufacturing sectors with spillovers for 
employment and skill development. As we see in Table 6.4 later in this chapter, over 
30 per cent of the FDI in Tamil Nadu was in high productivity sectors like auto, IT-
related and pharmaceuticals, in contrast to Gujarat where chemicals and 
petrochemicals accounted for just under 50 percent of FDI between 1991 and 2011. 
FDI in Gujarat over this period totalled USD 8.53 billion placing it in fifth position 
behind Tamil Nadu.  
 
 Figure 6.3. FDI in Indian states 2000-2011 
Source: (Mukherjee 2011: Table 2) 
The growth rate of per capita incomes has been consistently trending upwards 
(Table 6.2) and per capita incomes have been higher than the Indian average (Table 
6.1 for the 2013 figures). While Gujarat has been described (misleadingly in our 
opinion) by some Indian commentators as a model of good governance, it would be 
even harder to make that claim for Tamil Nadu. The Tamil Nadu case is interesting 
for examining the relationship between institutions and political configurations 
driving growth in a context of high levels of corruption and clientelism. Liberal 
economics models applied to India often miss the critical differences between states 
and attribute national growth outcomes to economic liberalization and India’s 
somewhat higher than average scores on good governance for its level of 
development (Basu 2003; Panagariya 2005; R. Rajan 2006). In reality, growth across 
states in India has varied widely and has been driven by very different factors in each 
case. In particular, political and institutional arrangements have varied significantly 
across Indian states. 
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Table 6.2.  Tamil Nadu Net State Domestic Product per capita growth rates at 
constant USD 1980-81  
Source: Based on EPW Research Foundation Statistics, State Level Domestic Product 
Data, 1960/61 to 2007/08.EPW data 
 
Tamil Nadu’s political settlement contrasts with that in Gujarat along a number of 
dimensions. In contrast to the dominant party in Gujarat, over the last two and a half 
decades the ruling coalition in Tamil Nadu has been one or other of the two main 
parties in short-lived governments that have always been thrown out at the next 
election. The two principal parties, DMK and AIADMK, are divided by their claims of 
being closer to their shared founding ideology. In reality they are of course clientelist 
political organizations based on the informal distribution of rents within their 
organizations. In a competitive clientelist political settlement, there are too many 
political organizers with powerful organizations and rent demands to be 
incorporated within a single party. This makes the levels of contestation and 
competition for recruiting organizers within the party organizations more intense. 
The intensity of the conflicts over interpretations of their founding ideology reflects 
this, but the similarity of their ideologies also moderates their strategies because 
neither party has the legitimacy to try and wipe out the other. Indeed the intensity 
of the ideological conflict between the two parties has decreased dramatically over 
the last three decades.  
We will see that the roots of the shared ideology of the two parties are in a pre-
Aryan Tamil nationalism that was also violently anti-Brahmin. Over time this has 
morphed into a more anodyne populist and left-of-centre politics. Politics therefore 
frequently has a populist colour in the state, as in many other Indian states perhaps 
with the exception of Gujarat. This is not to say that there are no populist schemes 
of the BJP in Gujarat but most of them have now become formal state-sponsored 
welfare schemes whereas in other states including Tamil Nadu, some or much of the 
populism works through informal rent distribution processes. In Tamil Nadu’s case 
populist schemes include the distribution of gold ‘thalis’, which are traditional 
symbols of marriage for Hindu women in south India, and free rice and mineral 
water to families living below the poverty line, over and above formal welfare 
schemes. Given this background it would not have been surprising if the state’s 
industrial trajectory had been similar to West Bengal where the Communist-populist 
ruling coalition sometimes adopted populist polices in the 1980s and 1990s to the 
detriment of industrial growth. So it is interesting that Tamil Nadu despite its 
competitive clientelism and populist politics including informal rent allocations 
managed to sustain high levels of industrial development. The key to this has been 
the relative stability of policy due to the specific distribution of power between the 
ruling coalition and currently excluded political organizations in the state. It is this 
configuration that we will analyse more deeply in the chapter.  
In Figure 3.2 in Chapter three we located Tamil Nadu in the quadrant for competitive 
clientelism. This reflects the fact that political organizations outside the ruling 
coalition are strong and as related to that, the lower level organizations within the 
ruling coalition are also strong because they always have the credible option of 
leaving and joining the opposition. Compared to Pakistan with its increasingly 
powerful and fragmented excluded organizations, Tamil Nadu is not as far to the 
right in the diagram, implying that excluded organizations are only moderately 
strong and in any case use ‘acceptable’ mechanisms of political competition. This is 
one reason why the state maintained relative policy stability despite electoral cycling 
and competitive clientelism. This feature of Tamil Nadu’s political settlement also 
ensured that successive governments would not overturn contracts and investments 
agreed upon by the previous government. As a result, large Indian industrial houses 
and multinational corporations flocked to the state over the years. Historically, when 
Congress was a dominant party in the 1960s, the state had already been pro-
business in its development policy. With the rise of the more populist Dravidian 
parties (Dravidian refers to a pre-Aryan indigenous culture in the Indian peninsula) 
industry did not retain its primacy, but policy did not become anti-business either. As 
a result investors were confident of bringing in and investing in technology-intensive 
sectors despite their long gestation periods of investment and learning. In particular, 
business organizations that needed policy stability but were already competitive and 
needed relatively little government support to become profitable were attracted to 
the state. For instance, in the mid-2000s, Tamil Nadu accounted for 21 per cent of 
passenger car production in India and 33 per cent of commercial vehicles (Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). It also had a significant electronics industry. Clearly, the state has 
the policy credibility to attract moderately large, high technology investments even 
though it did not have the reputation of having a centralised administration as in 
Gujarat run by an ‘efficient’ leader.  
Gujarat scores higher than Tamil Nadu in attracting even longer gestation projects 
like infrastructure projects, power generation and private ports. The time horizon for 
recovering investments in infrastructure projects like ports is typically much longer 
than that required for investments in electronics or autos and therefore the former 
require the state to credibly honour contracts over a longer period. Hence we do 
observe a significant difference in the sectoral industrial profiles of the two states. 
During the course of our fieldwork interviews a common response was that 
whichever party was in opposition was careful not to damage investor confidence. A 
number of significant respondents reported a tacit agreement between the two 
parties whereby the opposition would get a portion of the rents coming from new 
investments. Secondly opposition to projects or changing contracts ex post would 
threaten investments when that party expected to be in power, thereby affecting 
the flow of rents.  
 Figure 6.2. Contribution of some significant sectors in Tamil Nadu to the Indian 
manufacturing sector (all figures in percentages) in 2000-2001 
Note: HCV stands for Heavy Commercial Vehicles 
Source: www.ibef.org 
 
This implicit contract between the two parties in the competitive clientelist political 
settlement solved a number of credibility problems facing investors about the 
predictability of policies and the enforcement of their own contracts with the state 
over time. The live-and-let-live compromises in the organization of political 
competition and the informal rent sharing arrangements between the political 
parties at the highest level therefore served as an informal institutional structure 
that guaranteed continuity and provided credible commitments about contract 
enforcement to investors. However, the time horizon of credibility in contracting was 
limited to confidence that the next government was unlikely to make fundamental 
changes but the system itself faced vulnerabilities. This meant that the rent 
management institutions in Tamil Nadu could not offer very long-term contracts 
with high levels of credibility. This can help to explain why in the case of 
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infrastructure investments, Tamil Nadu did not perform as well as Gujarat. 
Nevertheless, the informal rent management institutions offered sufficient stability 
and credible short-term rent allocations that were sufficient to attract high capability 
companies that were already close to the competitiveness frontier in sectors like 
automobiles and later electronics. Capability development in the former had largely 
happened in the industrial policy era when Congress was the dominant party, and 
then in the 1980s in the early stages of the transition to competitive clientelism 
when the Maruti-Suzuki venture was organized (Khan 2011a).  
Tamil Nadu’s share of installed capacity in the auto components sector in India was 
32 per cent in 2010 and three Chennai based groups TVS, Amalgamated and Rane 
accounted for 22 per cent of India’s auto component production. Chennai has also 
emerged as India’s electronics hardware manufacturing centre with companies like 
Nokia and Flextronics setting up some of their biggest manufacturing units here. It is 
particularly significant that Tamil Nadu achieved these levels of industrial 
concentration in relatively high technology sectors without the natural resource base 
of Gujarat and without the centralized political administration that a dominant party 
can offer. As we see in Figure 6.2 Tamil Nadu’s share of engineering based industries 
like cars, Heavy Commercial Vehicles (HCVs) and auto components is substantial 
given that its population in 2011 was 5.8% of the Indian total (Table 6.1). The 
presence of industrial clusters in Tamil Nadu for small engineering (power pumps), 
ready-made garments and cotton yarn is also substantial providing broad-based 
employment opportunities. In contrast, in Gujarat relatively largest sectors are in 
capital-intensive activities like chemicals, petro chemicals and energy much of which 
also exploits Gujarat’s natural endowments and particularly oil reserves (Figure 5.2, 
Chapter Five). 
As in Gujarat, the ruling coalition in Tamil Nadu was able to offer incentives to 
particular investors by offering a series of upfront rents. The difference with Gujarat 
was in the nature of the business-government relationships through which large 
business houses maintained close links formally and informally with the government. 
As Gujarat had a dominant party system for over 15 years, links between privileged 
business houses and the Modi administration were uninterrupted and therefore 
deeper. In Tamil Nadu business houses have had to deal with a different ruling 
coalition every five years since 1989 and therefore did not have the kind of 
uninterrupted access to the administration as in Gujarat. Nevertheless, credible 
relationships that provided upfront rents to attract investments, followed by enough 
of an assurance that policies and contracts would not be immediately challenged by 
a new government attracted high capability companies that were already 
competitive or close to achieving competitiveness. These were precisely companies 
in sectors like autos, auto components, textiles and leather where capabilities had 
already been developed in the pre-liberalization years and in the 1980s when 
liberalization was in its very early stages.  
The roots of the original Dravidian movement in the region in the early 20th century 
were in an emancipatory politics based on rationalism and an attempt to redress the 
exclusion of backward castes in Tamil society. However, the politics of the two large 
political parties that claim their descent from this movement have evolved to 
become largely populist and clientelist. Leakages of public resources are used by 
both parties as informal rent allocations to support large party organizations. In fact 
industry and employment generation stagnated under the Dravidian parties, 
especially under the DMK (from which the AIADMK later broke away) in the 1980s as 
a result of these populist strategies. Some of the redistribution happened through 
formal populist schemes like the Mid-Day Meals scheme which we will discuss later. 
This scheme became one of India’s most successful redistributive welfare 
programmes. Implementation of such schemes encouraged even greater 
mobilizations of the state’s already relatively well-organized lower castes, in stark 
distinction from Gujarat. These mobilizations had repercussions for the survival 
strategies and legitimacy of the ruling parties. In order to maintain their legitimacy 
both parties had to vie with each other in devising and implementing welfare 
schemes and populism was a mechanism for achieving political stability and became 
an accepted and necessary part of the institutional distribution of benefits in the 
Tamil political settlement.  
It was precisely because the legitimacy of the ruling parties depended on their ability 
to deliver populist redistributive schemes that both pursued these policies, but the 
latter also led to a slowdown of growth and growing unemployment in the 1980s. 
The necessity of combining redistribution with growth led both parties to adopt 
proactively pro-industry positions in the 1990s. India’s liberalization reforms 
happened at a serendipitous moment for Tamil Nadu which could now make use of 
its high capabilities in engineering industries and in incipient industrial clusters like 
autos, textile and leather. Some of these capabilities were based on industrial 
location and licensing decisions of the industrial policy period, but some were based 
on the state’s strong performance in education. The state not only has one of India’s 
highest literacy rates but also houses some the highest numbers of tertiary 
education institutes in India, especially private engineering and medical universities.  
The Government of India ran the Indian Institute of Technology in Chennai. This 
institution is at the forefront of technical research in India that is of global standards, 
and in these areas Tamil Nadu is ahead of Gujarat. While most of the private colleges 
do not provide standards of education commensurate with the needs of cutting edge 
technology they have nonetheless helped create a pool of human capital that finds 
employment in the state’s fast growing IT and information technology enabled 
sectors (ITeS). Thus, 37 per cent of the state’s engineering graduates specialize in 
communications, IT or computer science. The accelerated development of private 
educational institutions is also an accidental result of another rent management 
strategy which provided party supporters with land to establish educational 
institutions that are often looked upon as lucrative business opportunities in the 
state. In other instances party supporters were granted liquor ‘licences’ and these 
were usually sold on for high profits. Some of these rents were subsequently 
channelled into the education sector. The rise in the high technology service sector 
exports from Tamil Nadu is in part a consequence of these public and private 
investments in education. This is an example of the argument in Chapter Two that 
the outcomes of rent seeking are more important than the immediate costs.  
One of the vulnerabilities of the political settlement in Tamil Nadu is that it subject 
to fragmentation from endogenous processes of political competition. Clientelist 
parties typically have dynastic and personality-based leaderships. The formal 
institutionalization of clientelist parties is difficult because these are coalitions of 
sub-organizations and every sub-organization is threatened if a leader identified with 
a particular sub-organization is elected to lead the whole party. The clientelist party 
structurally requires a leader who can act as neutral arbiter in its internal rent 
allocation contests and a dynastic leader is usually the most acceptable to all the 
internal factions. But this also means that inter-generational change can be 
contested and lead to a fragmentation of the party when there a multiple siblings or 
relatives claiming the succession. In addition, changes at the all-India level have 
resulted in a change in the types of rents that are available to important coalition 
partners in states. We will see that Tamil parties have been able to access very large 
centrally allocated rents with ease in the context of providing support to national 
coalitions in Delhi. This too has had an adverse effect in reducing the importance of 
managing state-level industrial rents with care. By the 2010s, the state began to face 
capability constraints in its manufacturing sector and neither party had a rent 
management strategy to address this problem. The constraints were not just at the 
level of the supply of skilled personnel being produced by educational institutes. 
There was also the challenge of financing new waves of learning-by-doing in 
capability development to move up the quality and technology chain in sectors like 
auto components. In both areas rent-management strategies were falling short of 
addressing the constraints. This problem is particularly acute in Tamil Nadu where 
the bulk of manufacturing is competing in globally competitive markets. In Gujarat 
the manufacturing specialization is somewhat different and enjoys greater entry 
barriers against global competition but even there the challenge of learning and 
capability development for developing new competitive sectors is likely to affect the 
sustainability of industrial growth.  
6.2 From an Ancient Civilization to Politics of Populism 
6.2.1 A brief history of Tamil Nadu: 
 
Like much of southern India Tamil history has been marked by linguistic and cultural 
differences from northern India. Even while Sanskrit was developing as one of the 
classical languages of the Indo-European languages group, the Tamil language was 
developing as an independent linguistic entity in the family of Dravidian languages. 
Evidence of a cultural region called ‘Tamilakam’ encompassing much of modern 
Kerala and Tamil Nadu comes from an ancient body of Tamil literature called 
Sangam. The Sangam is essentially a collection of heroic poetry with historians 
dating the work from the first century BCE to the sixth century CE. Non Tamil 
inscriptions from the era like Ashokan rock edicts also confirm the existence of this 
region called Tamilakam with five independent states. Archaeologically the Sangam 
era is said to correspond with the late Iron Age to the Early Historic period or 300 
BCE to 300 CE (Abraham 2003). At various times this literature has often been 
invoked by Dravidian parties as an example of the difference between north and 
south India. While this was often used to prove populist political points the 
instrumentalizing role played by the Tamil language through mobilizations that 
began in the 19th century have ensured it centrality in Tami politics (Ramaswamy 
1993). Sanskrit did indeed have a role to play in society in south India especially with 
regard to the adoption the Vedas there is little doubt that Tamil does indeed have a 
rich literary and cultural history of its own.  
By the first few centuries of the Common Era three kingdoms were already 
organizing territory in what is now Tamil Nadu, the Cholas, Pandyas and the Chedas: 
and under these kings trade routes were developed between the eastern 
Mediterranean and south-east Asia. A later dynasty called the Pallavas helped create 
a sovereign kingdom for the first time in the region (Stein 1998). Later Chola kings 
helped the kingdom become a naval power with frequent expeditions to the island 
that now make up Indonesia. It is telling that at no time before the British period in 
India did any north Indian dynasty rule over the entire southern Indian peninsula. By 
the beginning of the 14th century the region came under varying degrees of Islamic 
rule but unlike in the northern part of the country Islam and subsequent Hindu-
Muslim communalization played a limited role in the state’s politics.  
The first colonizing Europeans who evinced an interest in the region were the Dutch 
who chose Pulicat near Chennai as their base around 1609. The French and the 
British soon followed. By the middle of the 18th century the Dutch and Portuguese 
were by and large ousted from India and the south eastern coast of India where 
Tamil Nadu is situated reflected the rivalry the French and English shared in Europe.  
Three Carnatic (India’s south eastern coast) Wars were fought between the two rival 
colonial powers and Madras city changed hands between the two during this time. A 
famed standoff in South Asian history between the brilliant if eccentric French 
governor of Pondicherry, near Chennai, Francois Dupleix and Robert Clive who could 
be similarly described from the British side ended with the English winning control. 
But English and French interference in the south marked the beginning of a policy 
the British were to later use successfully across India. The policy of divide and rule 
used by the two was essentially about supporting one Indian side over the other to 
help consolidate their own rule in the South. The end of the third Carnatic war 
however decisively ended French rule in India. By the last decades of the 18th 
century the East India Company was very much in power and the area was deemed 
as Madras Presidency. 
Like Bombay, now Mumbai, in the west and Calcutta (Kolkata) in the east of India the 
British had developed the port of Madras to be their base in southern India. Similar 
to those two cities Madras, now Chennai also saw the establishment of British 
institutions like the judiciary and provincial administration. In fact Chennai was the 
first settlement the British created in India. The British made investments in 
upgrading agriculture, especially with regard to irrigation, industry and infrastructure 
with Madras port becoming the premier port in the south. It would be easy to say 
that these earlier institutional endowments have made it easier for Tamil Nadu to be 
the industrial success it is today. However while this history might have helped, 
attempts to leverage and build on it were attempted only in the post independence 
era, and not all of it in consciously intended ways.  Our framework shows that 
growth is dependent on the political settlement that determines how politics and in 
particular the organisation of power interacts with economic institutions. The 
historical strength of institutions is no guarantee of future growth because as we 
have discussed in Chapter two growth is not a linear sum of the effects of 
institutional variables. A very good example to demonstrate this would be the 
former first city of the British Raj in India, Calcutta. It was the capital of the Raj till 
1912 and the British lavished enough care and attention befitting a ‘second city’ on 
Calcutta. By the early 20th century Calcutta and Bengal province of which Calcutta 
was also the capital were the most industrialized in the country. Yet by the 1970s 
West Bengal and Calcutta were both in the throes of what is now commonly 
described in India in as de-industrialisation. Calcutta had similar institutional features 
to Mumbai and Chennai (except for its riverine port which was silting up as opposed 
to Mumbai’s and Chennai’s deep sea ports) yet the ruling coalition of Left parties 
chose an agrarian strategy of rent creation as opposed to industrialization (Khan 
2009a; Roy 2012). Coalitions in Maharashtra (of which Mumbai) is the capital and 
Tamil Nadu did not at least have antagonistic ties with capitalists. The next few 
sections will identify the combination of institutional variables that led to the 
political settlement with its specific growth stability trade off in Tamil Nadu. 
6.2.2 The origins of the Dravidian movement and a Congress attempt to overcome it 
in the initial years after independence 
 
Upper caste Brahmins were not the socially dominant force in the pre colonial era In 
Tamil Nadu (Subramanian 1999). It was with the coming of the British and their 
importance as a ‘scribal’ class that led to the rise of anti Brahminism. The Brahmins 
in Tamil Nadu had knowledge of the scriptures and therefore had an advantage in 
being educated. Much like the Brahmins of Bengal the British picked them to be their 
scribes giving them access to government jobs and consequently a level of prosperity 
the other castes did not have. British social engineering was based on early oriental 
anthropology and drew its authority from the scriptures. In Tamil Nadu many of the 
intermediate land owning castes were not Brahmins and when the British were 
legalizing tradition they relegated them to the lower castes. This was because while 
they were not Brahmins they couldn't be fitted into the other two warrior and 
trading castes either as the latter two did not seem to exist in Tamil Nadu, even 
though most backward castes like the Mukkalathors and Vanniyars consider 
themselves to be a martial caste. It was due to this reengineering that temple 
properties also came to be appropriated by the Brahmins as were temple practices. 
They also dominated Congress politics till the 1940s. The Brahmins had a distinct 
cultural identity in that they were more Sansrikitized and at least in scriptural terms 
closer to North Indian Brahmins. Along with their newly minted higher (than in pre- 
colonial times) political and social status this already existing cultural difference only 
added to perceptions of their superiority (Subramanian 1999).  
It was therefore telling that the first two political movements based on anti-
Brahminism were started by the elites among non-Brahmins. The Dravidian 
Association was formed in 1912 and the Justice party in 1916. The founders of these 
two organisations were ‘anglicized landlords’ who were demanding greater 
representation for non-Brahmins in professional and educational arenas and within 
the framework of colonial legality. An anti-Brahmin movement that was based 
specifically against their superior caste position vis a vis the Shudra was to come 
later in the form of EV Ramaswami Naicker, better known as Periar, in 1926. This was 
the Self Respect Association and the organisation became the precursor for a nativist 
movement based on a separate cultural and linguistic identity of non Brahmin Tamils 
from the rest of India. Periar is important also because both the DMK and AIADMK 
owe their ideological origins to him. Several other Dravidian parties like the MDMK 
and PMK also owe ideological allegiance to Periar and have often been coalition 
partners with the two main parties from time to time.  
Periar initially joined the Congress but was disillusioned with Gandhi’s ‘North Indian 
Brahminism’ and started the Self Respect Association. Given its avowed anti 
Brahminism on the basis of a felt deep social exclusion rather than one that 
represented non Brahmin elite sentiments of exclusion from government jobs the 
association became a more successful mass movement. Periar’s own attitude to 
both the Indian union and anti Brahminism is the subject of many academic debates 
and not within the purview of the paper. But we will quickly concise a few of his 
main ideological points in order to understand modern Tamil politics better. Periar 
was the first to articulate the ‘Dravidas’ or those living in the south of India were a 
race distinct from the north Indian ‘Aryans’. He opposed the Sanskritic caste system 
on the basis of hegemonic North Indian Hinduism and went so far as to demand a 
separate Dravid homeland or Dravida Nadu, as a separate entity from independent 
India. His views on religion were also heretical and iconoclastic though his attitude 
towards the Scheduled Castes of India (SC) or lower castes and Tamil Muslims and 
Christians remained ambivalent. The essence of his ideology was the primacy of the 
Shudra caste or the lowest of all castes according to Brahminical Hinduism 
(Subramanian 1999) It was this aspect of his ideology that the later parties would 
adopt. His successor CN Annadurai opposed secession at the time of independence 
and this was one of the reason why he split from the Association (by then called 
Dravida Kazagham or DK), in 1949 to form the DMK. Periar’s DK was against fighting 
elections while DMK was a political party ready to seek an electoral mandate. At this 
time the Congress formed the government in the first general elections in Tamil 
Nadu, then still called Madras state. The Congress was riding a nationalist wave all 
across India after independence and this propelled it to absolute majorities in most 
states. However the party did not get an absolute majority in Tamil Nadu and had to 
depend on alliances with smaller parties to keep out the DMK and form the 
government.  
However matters started looking up for the Congress in the assembly elections of 
1957 and 1962. The Congress government under K Kamaraj introduced a number of 
schemes for the Backward Classes in the state. Kamaraj himself was the first non-
Brahmin chief minister of Tamil Nadu and this helped the Congress consolidate its 
base amongst the intermediate castes in the state. While Kamaraj was not the chief 
minister over all of the seventeen years that the Congress ruled the state 
nonetheless received high levels of investment from India’s centrally planned 
economic model. The state became fairly industrialised by the 1950s and received a 
high proportion of investment in hydro-electric projects because of the abundance 
of large rain fed river systems in the state. It was under Kamaraj that the state 
received large public sector investments like the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd (BHEL), 
a heavy engineering company and till today one of the leaders in its sector in India. 
Tamil Nadu already had established industries like leather and textiles from the 
British times. A railway wagon making factory was established in Permabur near 
Chennai that still continues to function successfully. A number of sugar and paper 
mills were also established under his watch. Kamaraj also successfully negotiated the 
setting up of the prestigious Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) in Chennai. This IIT 
became one of the first five prestigious IITs of the country and is today known as the 
alma mater for some of the best engineers from India, and some would say even be 
comparable with the best international standards in engineering education. It is 
worth noting that Kamaraj was a trusted associate of Nehru and this personal 
equation served the state in good stead.  
A quick look at these ministers in the central cabinet and how they helped influence 
Tamil Nadu’s growth in the early post independence period is required now. For 
instance TT Krishnamachari was minister for commerce and industry, finance and 
steel for various periods between 1952 and 1965. He was also the founder of the TTK 
group of industries, a large conglomerate in south India which is now a Rs 1500 crore 
group. It is a successfully diversified group with manufacturing interests in consumer 
durables and pharmaceuticals among others as well as in services. The company is 
headquartered in Chennai and in its early years was certainly helped by the fact that 
Krishnamachari was himself a part of the government. C Subramaniam was first 
made minister for steel and mines in 1962 in the union cabinet and then became 
defence and finance ministers. From the second plan onwards India’s five year plans 
were heavily dependent on investments in capital goods related industries like steel 
to drive growth.  The portfolio of steel and mines is critical here because all Indian 
states were desirous of getting a steel plant at this stage. Tamil Nadu, despite being 
deficient in both coal and iron ore received a large investment from the central 
government in the steel sector—for instance the Salem Steel plant manufacturing 
special steels, though to be fair it is not an integrated steel plant which requires 
chiefly iron ore and coal. The politics of industrial location is still hotly debated in 
India and is not within the scope of this paper directly but ‘friendly’ central ministers 
went a long way in influencing where public sector investments went. R 
Venkataraman was an industry minister from Tamil Nadu who also promoted the 
state’s interests. He later went on to become president of India. A number of 
licences for manufacturing trucks and heavy vehicles were provided to Tamil Nadu in 
this period by these ministers (Aya and Siddharthan 2007).  
In 1967 the Congress received a rude jolt when the DMK won an absolute majority in 
the assembly elections for the state parliament. There were two key reasons for this. 
One was the Congress’ insistence on Hindi as the official language that led to anti-
Hindi riots in 1965. Second was the tenure of M Bakthavatsalam who took over as 
chief minister from Kamaraj after the latter left Tamil Nadu politics to become the 
president of the Congress Party at Nehru’s request. Bakthavatsalam was a Brahmin 
by caste and did not possess either Kamaraj’s political acumen in intermediate caste 
politics or sensitivity. The DMK under Annadurai effectively mobilised public support 
even in the latter case and ensured its electoral victory in the assembly elections of 
1967. This was a significant event not just for Tamil Nadu but also for India because 
this heralded the beginning of non-Congress governments to last a full term across 
the country (A communist government elected in 1957 in Kerala state was dismissed 
by Nehru in 1959), though the wave of regional party-led governments was still 
some time away. In Tamil Nadu itself the Congress has never regained power since. 
The Congress has been marginalised to the extent that it won only five seats in an 
assembly of 234 in the legislative elections. 
6.3 The years of the Dravidian parties, the DMK and the AIADMK: 
The watering down of Periar and the DK’s initially strident ideologies (of anti-
Hinduism, anti-North India and an opposition of minority religions like Islam, 
because of its formal ritualistic structures) by the DMK and later AIADMK made the 
Dravidian movement more fluid and therefore both popular and populist 
(Subramanian 1999) It helped that the central government or centre in New Delhi 
also made important concessions like granting a separate Tamil state on a linguistic 
basis and backtracked from making Hindi the only official language along with 
English. This helped the DMK to ‘deradicalize’. It also reflected the true power base 
of Tamil Nadu, the intermediate castes, as opposed to the Congress support base 
that represented the Brahmans (Kohli 1998). The primary reason for the creation of 
the AIADMK was the competition for leadership of the DMK between two of its main 
leaders M Karunanidhi and MG Ramachandran or MGR after Annadurai’s death 
(Sastry 1974). MGR was one of Tamil cinemas most popular heroes, sometimes 
hailed even as a demi god by his fans. In fact the third reason for the undivided 
DMK’s unprecedented success was that MGR had sustained a life-threatening injury 
around the time of the elections and the ‘sympathy’ votes cast in his favour helped 
the DMK with its electoral victory (Subramanian 1999). In 1973 MGR broke away 
with his sizable faction based on his image as a socially crusading matinee idol 
(Pandian 1989). This interplay between the socio-cultural, popular culture and 
politics in Tamil Nadu and indeed South India has been dealt with extensively in the 
literature but will not be dealt with in this paper as it is beyond our current scope. 
However the MGR faction, called ADMK, later the AIADMK, was also able to mobilize 
groups that the DMK was not focusing on. This included castes like the Nadars and 
Mukkalathors and the party also appealed more to female voters. The AIADMK has 
tried to reach out to Dalits but has not been adequately successful as Dalit 
mobilizations are now beginning to gain independent ground (Pandian 2000).  
Taking this analysis further the creation of the AIADMK from the DMK and later the 
even more caste-coalition specific PMK in 1989 had a two-fold consequence in the 
way Tamil politics played out. For one the AIADMK incorporated the political 
aspirations of caste groupings the DMK had neglected and thereby decreased the 
possibility of any violent mobilization by these groups. The incorporation then led to 
greater relative stability, at least for two decades despite the fragmentation of the 
political order. Second this also meant government patronage, whether directly to 
key stakeholders or through redistribution programmes led to a distribution of 
resources to groups which would not have otherwise been beneficiaries. Of course 
such a structure runs the risk of breaking down and becoming detrimental if the 
fragmentation gets too minute and there are not enough resources to make all 
breakaway factions happy. This has not yet been the case in Tamil Nadu. Also the 
breakaway group of the AIADMK commanded enough support to pose a serious 
threat to the DMK. Later groups like the PMK or MDMK have been too small pose 
real competition to the two main parties. Stability achieved through this form of 
mobilisation seems to have actually had a growth enhancing effect on the state's 
economy. This could in fact run counter to the claim that nativist policies usually 
impede growth. A similar conclusion was reached by Swamy when he contended the 
state’s two party system helped prevent the outbreak of violence (Swamy 1998). The 
DMK was able to build sizable support among the state’s Muslim population because 
Annadurai was careful to forge closer relations with the community. It must be 
noted however that the AIADMK is not uncomfortable with employing the language 
a ‘soft hindutva’ when the need arises (Schwecke 2011).  
Having come to power the DMK was now adept at using Tamil identity from within 
the confines of formal democracy and this has since become the hallmark of the 
Dravidian movement. The links between Tamil cultural identity and outright political 
mobilization has remained muted and somewhat ambiguous since. The AIADMK has 
also followed a similar strategy since. The core of the DMK’s policies at this stage 
though remained true to its roots in the Dravidian movement of anti Brahmanism.  It 
was the first state in the country to appoint a ministry for Backward Classes Welfare 
though ministries for Scheduled Castes existed elsewhere. It appointed a backward 
Class Commission and raised the percentage of reserved seats or ‘quotas’ for 
Backward Classes in educational institutions from 25 percent to 31 percent in line 
with the Committee’s recommendations. By bringing in new more affluent castes in 
to the category of Backward Class it increased the share of such classes in the 
population from 41 percent to 51 percent. It also provided ‘quotas’ for Christians 
and Muslims who had originally been Hindu Scheduled Castes as well as for Dakhni 
Urdu speaking Muslims. This ensured consistent Muslim support for the DMK 
(Subramanian 1999).  The fact that richer castes were brought into the fold also 
made the party popular among intermediate classes and in fact laid the base for 
disenchantment with the DMK on the part of Dalits in the state.  
The 1970s was the period that the patron-client politics of Tamil Nadu began to take 
shape. The DMK used redistribution and more explicit patronage to build up a loyal 
clientelist base. The DMK government rewarded farmers in the state’s northern 
plains with an expansion of wells and tank irrigation networks. This made 
commercial agricultural viable for farmers, especially peanut farming. The area of 
the northern plains was where the party had made initial gains and was now being 
rewarded for its support. Most of the construction contracts were awarded to party 
supporters or wealthy farmers influential in the area who could be depended upon 
to bring with them the support of the villagers. As an example Subramanian 
mentions NC Ramaswami Gounder, a small time leader from the Vanniyar caste who 
was lured to the DMK fold with such contracts. In turn Gounder brought with him 
the support of his extended clan and supporters (Subramanian 1999). To go back to 
our framework this would count as a sound example of how a clientelist political 
settlement works. As a retired bureaucrat familiar with the workings of Tamil Nadu 
told us, ‘Even if all the roads and tanks did not get built at least some did. And where 
none existed it is better than nothing’. While it was building its base among the 
intermediate classes with such instances of patronage the party was also ensuring 
militant industrial trade unions were immobilized and promoted its own unions, 
especially in factories where Communist unions were strong (Subramanian 1999). 
The DMK however maintained support for workers’ unions after it demobilized the 
Communist run ones earning it the displeasure of some capitalists in the state. Apart 
from its base among the richer peasants in the state the party was gradually building 
a coalition of traders and industrialists in the major urban centres like Coimbatore 
and Madras hence it needed to stamp out militant trade unionism. On the other 
hand the DMK made peace with agricultural unions as at this time it was 
consolidating its base among prosperous caste groupings with ties of traditional 
kinship among smaller farmers. It was not just easier for the DMK to suppress 
agricultural unions but also made for better politics of survival. The DMK faced it’s 
most serious threat in 1972 when MGR was suspended from the party’s primary 
membership. While analysts ascribes the schism to both MGR’s growing popularity 
and the fact that he disagreed with the DMK’s corrupt practices our analytical 
framework seems to suggest another line of reasoning.  
By the late 1960s MGR had come to realize he was the star attraction for the DMK. 
His ‘fan clubs’ used to mobilise support for the undivided DMK, his rallies always 
registered huge attendance and many had not heard of the DMK but knew it only as 
‘MGR’s party’. MGR started asserting his influence within the DMK as a reflection of 
his importance in gaining the party votes. Karunanidhi was not willing to grant him 
the level of authority MGR saw as commensurate with his stature and decided to 
deal the DMK a body blow (Sastry 1974). He had enough supporters mobilized both 
within the DMK and outside and by 1972 when the split took place MGR was 
confident he would be a grave threat to the DMK’s dominance and formed the 
ADMK or Anna DMK. In other words MGR was ready with another large patron-client 
grouping that could unsettle the political settlement created under the DMK. MGR’s 
mobilization of his supporters into an opposing patron-client faction meant that he 
was then in a position to significantly change the distribution of benefits within the 
settlement and this in turn increased the holding power of his faction. This was 
demonstrated by the fact that the party won a by-election just seven months after 
its formation. A by-election in India is conducted after a legislative or parliamentary 
constituency is left empty for some reason (usually the death of the sitting legislator 
or annulment of an earlier electoral result) and in some cases can be used as an 
indicator of support for the next elections for the party that wins the by-elections. 
The DMK employed significant state machinery to thwart the ADMK candidate but 
the latter emerged victorious. Clearly here we see our framework at work. The 
ADMK had gained enough traction to hold out against the more powerful ruling DMK 
and was able to inflict losses not yet commensurate with the ADMK’s formal 
structure. Most of the supporters and campaigners in the ADMK’s mobilization 
programme, and not just for the elections, were students with little experience in 
politics before the by elections took place (Subramanian 1999). By the time MGR 
won elections in 1977 Karunanidhi had already for almost a decade from 1967 to 
1976. 
What MGR was effectively doing was taking positions that had a wide enough appeal 
and which the DMK would have difficulty in claiming. For instance MGR was 
consciously watering down the anti-North Indian stance of the DMK and making his 
politics more inclusive to the extent that his supporters even included Brahmins. This 
combination of political positions was inclusive enough to appeal to those who felt 
alienated by the DMK’s nativism but at the same time appealed to voters who 
preferred a political opposition with Dravidian roots rather than a Congress which 
traditionally was weak in Tamil Nadu. Apart from this successful nuancing of political 
positions the AIADMK under MGR and later his protégé Jayalalithaa Jeyaram was 
also to become more populist in terms of redistributive politics while it was in 
power. Given that the DMK had already laid the ground for redistributive politics in 
the state the AIADMK could only go further. It did so by launching schemes that were 
based more on handouts and could be delivered more directly to people. For 
instance AIADMK sponsored schemes included free mid-day meal schemes for 
children in state run primary schools or providing free rice and in one instance even 
promising a television set to each household. The effect of such policies was more 
direct and immediate. The DMK’s redistributive policies were based more on 
reservations for various castes (though the AIADMK by no means abandoned this) or 
schemes to alleviate unemployment. The mid day meal scheme however was to 
become so successful that it was adopted by states across India as an incentive to 
send children to school (Dreze and Goyal 2003). The scheme’s origins are another 
insight into how redistributive policies if properly targeted can deliver results, 
however expedient their origins (Harris-White 2004).  
The scheme was originally implemented as much to placate one of MGR’s and the 
AIADMK’s strongest support base, women. At that time Tamil Nadu was running up a 
high fiscal burden given the large number of welfare schemes the government was 
running. The fact that DMK had implemented prohibition laws ensured a significant 
portion of revenue was lost by the exchequer. The AIADMK reversed prohibition 
laws to make up for the fiscal shortfall. Liquor licences were introduced and they 
soon became the largest source of revenue for the state. The liquor industry became 
one of the fastest growing industries in the state in the early 1980s growing at about 
20 percent annually. By 1981 alone the AIADMK government had sold 15,000 
licences. AIADMK activists cornered a large share of these and resold them at higher 
prices, ostensibly garnering funds for themselves as well as the party. In fact one 
such entrepreneur made enough from pay-offs by selling liquor licences to start a 
chain of educational institutions across the state. In the midst of this however MGR 
ran the risk of alienating women who saw the repeal of prohibition laws as inimical 
to their interests with male members of their household getting access to cheap, 
legal liquor (Subramanian 1999). 
The noon meal scheme was one of the most ambitious in scope in the country and 
was initially launched for six million children between the ages of two and nine. 
Incidentally the first such scheme was launched in Tamil Nadu when the Congress’ 
Kamaraj was the chief minster but it did not have the scope that the programme had 
under MGR. By 1984 it was extended to 12 million people and included homeless 
widows, veteran soldiers and the most poor among Scheduled Castes. The 
programme also employed many disadvantaged women and members of the 
Scheduled Castes. The scheme became very popular and remains associated with 
MGR to this day and had positive effects on the enrolment statistics in the state (I. S. 
Rajan and Jayakumar 1992). However this scheme was also used to distribute 
benefits to AIADMK’s supporters and once again underscores how development 
policies cannot be made in a vacuum. It also shows how clientelistic and 
programmatic politics come together in developing countries. The underlying 
politics, especially in terms of who the beneficiaries in the patron-client structure are 
has to be taken into account. When we spoke to interviewees in the course of our 
research it became clear that the key reason for the extension of the mid day meal 
scheme was that it reached out to a constituency the AIADMK was in danger of 
losing as well providing the party a channel to distribute lucrative contracts to run 
the scheme among its key supporters. Anecdotal and academic evidence suggests 
that procurement and distribution associated with the scheme initially provided 
AIADMK supporters with enough payoffs to keep them loyal (Subramanian 1999; 
Harris-White 2004). Later when the DMK ran the scheme it was similarly used to 
distribute patronage. In fact the scheme has been attacked by many who feel its 
aims of providing nutrition are being undermined by the corruption evident in its 
implementation. The purpose here is not to say that corruption should be allowed to 
be endemic. It is however an attempt at highlighting that corruption or illegal rent 
seeking is a structural feature of clientelist political settlements in much the same 
way as the AIADMK and DMK use schemes in an informal manner to build and 
sustain their respective coalitions in the absence of a large formal sector through 
which to channel resources. However as Wyatt has pointed out the fact that while 
Tamil Nadu politics under the Dravidian parties remains clientelistic both have 
combined it with ‘programmatic politics’ aligned with its populism (Wyatt 2013). 
Unlike recent arguments in some of the literature on India coming from political 
scientists (Wilkinson 2007; Manor 2010; Elliott 2011) the continuation of clientelism 
through formal programmes does not imply India is moving towards a post 
clientelistic phase. It only means that India’s political settlement is evolving into one 
where some programmes at the centre and in some states like Gujarat patron-client 
interactions are taking place through formal programmes. Even in the case of the 
National Rural Employment Guarantee Act programme which could be classified as a 
formal redistributive programme leakages take place on the lines described by Khan 
(1998) as suggested by media reports from some of India’s’ leading publications 
(Mahboob 2010; Times 2012). 
A notable feature in the last few decades has however been a whittling down of the 
difference in redistributive policies between the two parties. It is now more a 
question of competition between the two. For instance the DMK continued to run 
the mid day meal scheme after it came to power given its popularity. While MGR 
was alive he was the clear differentiator between the two parties and his popular 
appeal was also higher. With his death in 1987 the gap between the two parties has 
narrowed even more. Yet the competition between the two is so intense that the 
leaders of the two parties Karunanidhi and Jayalalithaa (she is known by her first 
name and hence we do the same) have not hesitated to jail each other when one is 
out of power. This sort of politics is unprecedented even in India where political 
rivalry among parties frequently descends into bloody violence. There is an 
apocryphal story that Jayalalithaa preserved the aluminium plate on which she was 
served her meals in jail after her arrest in 1997 by then chief minister Karunanidhi. 
When she came back to power she instructed the jail authorities to serve 
Karunanidhi in the same plate after his arrest in 2003. Yet despite such bitterness at 
the personal level instances where the incumbent party has reneged on a significant 
investment decision made by the other while it was in power have been rare in the 
state. It is this unique political arrangement that has allowed the state to provide the 
stability necessary for industrial growth.  
 
6.4 Relationship with the ‘Centre’, Coalition Politics of Today and the DMK and 
AIADMK 
Given that we are presenting the case study of a state within the Indian federation 
no analysis will be complete without a discussion on the dynamics between the state 
and the central government in New Delhi. Tamil Nadu’s politics despite being 
concerned with specific regional factors and dominated by regional parties was also 
affected by political coalitions making up the central government that the DMK and 
AIADMK were part of. While the dynamics of national politics did not create a sizable 
dent during state assembly elections national level parliamentary elections saw the 
two Tamil parties forge alliances with national parties, especially the Congress and 
the BJP. By the mid 1980s the Congress’ stranglehold on national politics was 
significantly loosened. The first ever non Congress government was already 
experimented with in 1977 and though it did not last long, the Congress no longer 
seemed unassailable. By 1989 India was well on its way to learning to live with 
coalition governments. Regional parties from across India especially stronger ones 
like the AIADMK and the DMK were now in a position to dictate terms to national 
parties with regard to the choice of ministerial departments and as we will see in this 
section even in terms of pushing their own agenda in return for support to the 
national party. Depending on who gets a majority for the parliamentary elections in 
the state either the DMK or the AIADMK wins about 15 to 18 of the 39 parliamentary 
seats the state has. For a national party that has to cobble together a coalition in 
order to form the government these numbers regional parties provide are 
significant. 
In 1989 the Congress allied with the AIADMK for parliamentary elections and 
Jayalalithaa used this alliance to bring down the DMK government in Chennai and 
the AIADMK won a large majority in the Tamil Nadu assembly elections. This was 
possible largely because both the Congress and the AIADMK ran a campaign that 
indicted the DMK leadership of being in collusion with the Sri Lankan Tamil 
secessionist organization LTTE that was responsible for the assassination of former 
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. The accusations were never proved but it did help the 
AIADMK win the 1991 assembly elections. Incidentally more radical elements of the 
DMK were known to provide tacit support to Sri Lankan Tamils fighting to break 
away from Sri Lanka but it was never a key ideology of the DMK. However since the 
Sri Lankan government’s brutal crackdown on its Tamil citizens in the north east of 
the country both political parties in Tamil Nadu have forced the Congress in the 
centre to be more assertive in its opposition towards Sri Lanka. 
The DMK on the other hand tested its national fortunes by being part of a non-
Congress, non-BJP coalition government that lasted from 1996 to 1998. This 
government did not last the full five years of its term but the DMK was already 
getting a taste of what national presence meant as it had ministers in the national 
cabinet who oversaw important portfolios (or ministries) like oil and gas and 
industry. This was at a time when the DMK was not in power in Tamil Nadu but by 
dint of the fact that it was now a member of the union cabinet it could still influence 
decisions about the state. This dynamic actually captures the changing nature of the 
Indian political structure and the balances and counterbalances that have sustained 
it since the breakdown of the Congress dominated one-party political settlement. 
From the mid 1970s the Congress was unable to keep up with the growing demands 
of a population that was beginning to feel some benefits of economic growth and 
demanded greater participation politically or economically in decision making 
processes. Industrial licencing had failed both as a strategy for growth and 
patronage. Intermediate classes were demanding more than the Congress could 
accommodate (Khan 2011b). It was from this political churning that India’s political 
space became more fragmented. Interestingly space was not made by offshoots of 
the Congress but was a result of genuine grassroots movements based on 
mobilizations that were either ethno-linguistic (Telegu Desam in the southern state 
of Andhra Pradesh) or on mobilization of backward classes the Congress could no 
longer represent (like the Rashtriya Janata Dal in Bihar). This was an expansion of the 
federal Indian political structure rather than a fragmentation though on the face of it 
might seem like fragmentation given the internecine nature of political battles and 
ever expanding roster of political parties in India. Yet India has not seen a hung 
parliament in the last 15 years (three parliamentary elections) and political parties 
have been able to form alliances that have lasted their terms, a marked change from 
the turmoil of the early 1990s (though the next general elections in 2014 might well 
mark a return to unstable coalitions). This could be described as a centrifugal force 
at play where political mobilizations from the margins of the Congress dominant 
party system, and not from within it, enlarged the political space rather than 
fragmentation from within the Congress. This meant a shifting of power from the 
Congress to regional parties as well as the BJP. With a tightly knit Congress led 
dominant party system no longer possible the ‘loosening’ did not lead to a damaging 
breakdown but created a political order that was able to absorb the organizational 
power of the mobilising coalitions and prevent a collapse. How sustainable this 
process is depends on how fast factions break away and how effective existing 
factions are in distributing the benefits of economic growth.  
In Tamil Nadu’s case it meant the AIADMK and DMK leveraging their relationship 
with the two national parties for gains both at the central and state level. For 
instance the AIADMK joined the BJP-led NDA government with 28 Members of 
Parliament in Delhi and Jayalaithaa then insisted that the BJP dismiss the DMK 
government in Chennai. The then Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee refused and 
Jayalalithaa brought down the government in Delhi by one vote. The DMK was quick 
to offer support to the BJP soon after to ensure it retained clout in the centre to 
countervail Jayalalithaa. The DMK became part of the NDA government when 
elections were held again in but by 2003 it had withdrawn from the government. The 
next two general elections in 2004 and 2009 saw the DMK with the Congress’ UPA 
and the DMK extracted a due price for this support by asking and getting plum 
ministries for Karunanidhi’s associates, especially his family, namely a nephew and a 
daughter. Jayalalithaa meanwhile stayed away from the NDA perhaps reading 
correctly that the BJP’s fortunes were not on the ascendant. However an energized 
BJP under the likely leadership of Narendra Modi seems a formidable threat to the 
incumbent Congress and Jayalalithaa who is now chief minister of Tamil Nadu will 
most likely ally with the BJP in the coming national elections in 2014. This is what 
Sinha calls the ‘partisan route’ where state-level parties use their regional strengths 
to leverage with the national government for ministries or industrial investments 
(Sinha 2003). This was apparent when Dayanidhi Maran India’s telecommunications 
minister during the UPA’s first term, a member of Parliament belonging to the DMK 
successfully negotiated with mobile telephony hardware manufacturer Nokia and 
electronics design firm Flextronics to set up their India operations in Sriperumbudur 
near Chennai. Sriperumbudur has since developed into one India’s most successful 
manufacturing clusters with companies like Hyundai, (one of the earliest in the area), 
Ford, Nissan, Samsung and Dell also setting up operations there. A combination of 
informal compulsions emanating from Maran’s ministry to locate the Nokia and 
Flextronics units in Sriperumbudur, both of which were in sectors in line with his 
ministries and the already developed manufacturing environment around Chennai 
helped clinch the deals for Tamil Nadu when other states were also vying for them. 
The DMK controlled the telecommunication ministry in both its stints with the UPA 
though its second term was not as productive for the state as the first. The party was 
recently divested of the portfolio owing to corruption charges against the relevant 
minister A Raja. This ministry was more often in the news for conducting 
undervalued auctions for telecom spectrums to create rents for themselves and 
other beneficiaries than for any other reason.  The core of the controversy is the fact 
that the licences were provided at deflated prices contrary to ruling market prices 
and there was no competitive bidding involved in the entire process, a result of the 
reverse patron-client relationships we have described in Chapter four. Some of these 
licences were then part-sold at multiples of the original amount. All of this, it is 
alleged, was arranged in collusion with Raja, a key member of the DMK and a close 
associate of Karunanidhi’s daughter.  
The Congress could only watch as the DMK with 18 seats in India’s parliament but 
still the second largest party conducted the affairs of the telecom ministry without 
much discretion. Most parties recognize that corruption is a part of the system and 
the Congress itself is no stranger to allegations of corruption, far from it. But most 
political parties still prefer to be discreet in their dealings because corruption can 
quickly become an issue that wins or loses elections. When details of the way 
spectrum was allocated started becoming public it threatened to destabilise the UPA 
government. The Congress in a show of strength asked for Raja’s resignation and 
instituted an investigation because of which Karunanidhi’s daughter and Raja both 
spent time in jail. Interestingly the DMK continues to be a part of the UPA alliance 
and Kanimozhi’s candidature to India’s upper house of parliament was facilitated by 
the Congress. The DMK’s performance has been one its worse in recent history and 
analysts have put the results down to a sort of fiefdom being run by a now ageing 
Karunanidhi’s (he is 87) family and associates which leaves very little scope of 
patronage for outsiders. A succession battle seems to be brewing between 
Karunanidhi’s two sons and this is bound to influence the political settlement in 
Tamil Nadu.  
 
6.5 How the Politics Affected Critical Areas of Institutional Operation 
 
The political processes we outline in sections 6.3 and 6.4 have had very specific 
growth outcomes in Tamil Nadu’s. As we mentioned earlier in Section 3.3 of Chapter 
three rents can be delivered to patron-client factions and political organizers in many 
ways including through productive allocation of rents. In Tamil Nadu’s case a 
combination of manufacturing capabilities built during the early years of Congress 
rule and the opportunities that the Dravidian  parties created post liberalization for 
industrial investments as part of coalition governments at the centre ensured rent 
allocation in the state remained productive even though the corruption in the state 
is well documented unlike in other Indian states like Uttar Pradesh or Bihar (Wade 
1985; Ambirajan 1999; Harris-White 2004; Vasudevan 2006). This led to higher levels 
of ancillarization, creation of cluster based industries like leather and textiles as well 
as a high technology oriented service sector in IT, ITeS and healthcare. Tamil Nadu 
also has cluster oriented industries like small engineering, leather and garments, 
investments in which can be traced back to its populist politics. The Dravid parties 
while being unabashedly populist also had to cater to a very mobilized intermediate 
class on whom an 'overhang' of Periyar's Rationalist movement still remains. So 
unlike in Bihar or UP which didn't experience similar movements of socio-economic 
empowerment but were overtly about political empowerment parties in TN also had 
to generate employment. It's leather and garments cluster is precisely about that 
though of course the usual caveats about labour repression have to kept in mind. So 
while the two parties were competing on populism they also had to compete on 
delivering economic growth. As a result the state has attracted a significant share of 
FDI and Indian investment from businesses that have come to realize that corrupt 
does not necessarily mean unstable or predatory. Tamil Nadu’s investment profile 
comprises of high technology, high capital cost sectors which are already close to the 
global competitiveness frontier with available human resources. These investments 
do not need much government assistance in the catching up process, but they do 
need government assistance in acquiring land, assistance for overcoming specific 
market failures and credible commitments not to overturn contracts in the future.  
A senior executive from the auto industry also remarked that whichever party comes 
to power in Tamil Nadu the bureaucrats working with it ensure that at least the 
larger, high profile investments go through unimpeded. A senior corporate 
personality summed up the current state of Tamil Nadu’s political parties in this 
manner—“They stand for themselves and against each other”. In this connection a 
‘70-30’ rule is said to have existed in the state for some time. This refers to an 
arrangement where the payoff was split between the government and opposition in 
a 70-30 ratio. This is to ensure that once the current incumbent is part of the 
opposition the then-ruling party does the same with them. This meant both political 
parties had an incentive to invite industrial investments. Our corporate source also 
said the payoff was never more than 10-15 percent of the investment so investors 
were not particularly daunted by the amount either. Yet this has not stopped Tamil 
Nadu from becoming one of India’s leading industrial states. A structure like Tamil 
Nadu’s could always be in danger of letting rent seeking become predatorial. While 
this sort of rent seeking is not yet evident the long-term infrastructural investments 
that are more pronounced in Gujarat are less in evidence in Tamil Nadu. 
The clientelist political settlement is the most common among developing countries 
and indeed all parts of India exhibit it. Yet frequent contestations in most states 
mean a decline in either industrial growth or political stability, for instance in Uttar 
Pradesh or for some time in Maharashtra. The reason this doesn't happen in Tamil 
Nadu is that at a fundamental level the constituencies the two parties are reaching 
out to remain fairly similar, at least so far. This ensured critical policies stayed in 
place even if governments changed, like reservations for the Backward Classes or the 
Castes mid day meal schemes for children in primary schools. It can be argued that it 
would be unwise of any government to backtrack on successful policies 
implemented by the previous one but this has been known to happen in India. As a 
senior ex-bureaucrat told us both the parties had fluid philosophies, especially when 
it came to fighting elections. It might be recalled here that this was in sharp contrast 
to Periar who never wanted to contest elections and whose party, DK was 
ideologically quite iconoclastic. Since the Congress in the state was relatively weak 
and the two main parties represented a highly mobilised population based on 
principles of representation and equality populist schemes proved easier and in fact 
necessary to implement. Education was a sector both the parties prioritised—
primary schooling through the mid day meal schemes and through the private 
engineering and medical colleges. The first was for redistributive reasons and the 
second was seen as a channel for rent creation. As a result, Tamil Nadu’s 
performance on certain related human development indicators is higher than most 
south Asian standards, and certainly higher than the Indian average. It is ranked at 
number three behind Kerala and Maharashtra in terms of overall literacy rates. Yet 
the state also exhibits high inequality and some studies while recognising political 
clientelism as a ‘necessary evil’ have ascribed the inequality to Tamil Nadu’s 
competitive clientelist politics whereby poverty alleviation programmes might be 
implemented selectively depending on the support particular villages provide 
(Markussen 2010). Yet that would not seem to be the case in Tamil Nadu where the 
two parties adopt each other’s schemes when successful (as with the mid day meal 
schemes). In the course of our research we found that some slums in Chennai keep 
both the parties’ flags handy and unfurl them depending on which party is in power. 
This way they don't lose out on largesse from either party given the nature of their 
cycling.  
The fact that the two parties have a common ideological ancestry helps electorally 
because voters are able to migrate from one to the other without significantly 
compromising or giving up their ‘belief systems’ or more simply put political 
leanings. This is demonstrated by the fact that till assembly elections in 2011 where 
the DMK put in its most dismal performance, notwithstanding who won the two 
Dravidian parties each garnered at least 25 percent of the vote share. Between the 
two their vote share remains consistently over 55 percent since the 1980s (Table 
6.3). What then becomes significant are the voters at the margin who decide which 
party gets the majority. Analysing who the marginal voters might be and why they 
tipped to one or the other side is not the purpose of the paper. This statistic was 
used to demonstrate how similar the electoral results were for the two parties. Since 
these results also reflected the true distribution of power there was seldom serious 
violence contesting them. This similarity in the constituency that both addressed also 
ensured policy continuity. This was because no party needed to experiment radically 
to reach out to newer sections of society. It is this fortuitous combination of social 
and political structures that has helped maintain political stability in Tamil Nadu and 
in turn has been advantageous for its growth prospects.  
To be sure both the DMK and AIADMK sought to reach out to constituencies other 
than their core grouping. The two parties do not fight elections on startlingly 
different platforms even though their opposition to each other is bitter. This is one 
reason why the clientelist settlement in Tamil Nadu is fiercely competitive. What the 
two parties cannot do with ideology they make up for by competing over who 
delivers that ideology best. In the context of the clientelist framework we have 
discussed in Chapter three, such a strategy is important to keep their respective 
support base mobilised. A similar situation exists in Bangladesh where electoral 
constituencies remain broadly similar and the two parties differ very little in terms of 
policies but the clientelist political settlement in that country has had less dramatic 
growth outcomes. The reasons for this are ‘zero-sum’ games played by the two main 
parties that end in irreconcilable ideological positions based on differing myths of 
nation creation. The live and let live ‘formula’ that has helped Tamil Nadu so far does 
not yet seem a viable option to that country’s main parties. Given this investors in 
capital intensive projects like infrastructure projects are wary of commitments made 
by either party being reneged upon when the other is voted out of power. This has 
an adverse effect on the growth stability trade off (Khan 2012) Another reason for 
the zero-sum posture adopted in Bangladesh is that it is national governance that 
the two parties are concerned with. This makes the stakes higher. In India the 
federal structure acts somewhat as a ‘shock absorber’ and given the nature of 
coalition politics currently parties can look to form coalitions at the national level 
too.  
Year Party Seats 
contested 
Seats 
won 
% of votes 
polled 
% of votes in seats 
contested 
Total 
seats 
1977 ADK 
DMK 
200 
230 
130 
 48 
30.36 
24.89 
35.36 
25.26 
234 
1980 ADK 
DMK 
177 
112 
129 
37 
38.75 
22.1 
50.43 
45.7 
234 
1984 ADK 
DMK 
155 
167 
132 
24 
37.03 
29.34 
54.33 
40.79 
234 
1989 DMK 
ADK 
(JL)* 
202 
198 
150 
27 
33.18 
21.5 
38.7 
24.99 
234 
1991 ADK 
DMK 
168 
176 
164 
2 
44.39 
22.46 
61.14 
29.89 
234 
1996 DMK 
ADMK 
182 
168 
173 
4 
42.07 
21.47 
54.04 
29.54 
234 
2001 ADMK 141 132 31.44 52.08 234 
DMK 183 31 30.92 39.02 
2006 DMK 
AIADMK 
132 
188 
96 
61 
26.46 
32.64 
45.99 
40.81 
234 
2011 AIADMK 
DMK 
NA 150 
23 
NA NA 234 
 
Table 6.3. Electoral performance of the DMK and AIADMK 
Source: Election Commission of India (ECI) Statistical reports, various years, results 
for 2011, ECI website, http://eciresults.ap.nic.in/  (ECI 2011)  
* The year the pattern of cycling began. Also the year when the ADK broke up after 
MGR’s death. We have featured the Jayalalitha faction as that came to be recognised 
as the official one. 
NA- not available 
 
The AIADMK’s decision to distribute liquor licences was however a break from the 
DMK’s policies and led to many party members gaining through selling them 
onwards. Some used this capital to invest in education and make the gains look more 
legitimate. But both the DMK and AIADMK used private education as a means to 
distribute patronage and generate payoffs. Tamil Nadu (along with other southern 
states) actively encourages the establishment of private higher education institutes 
like engineering and medical colleges. Admission to such an institute can sometimes 
include what is inscrutably called ‘capitation fees’ which can be anywhere from 
$10,000 to $15,000. Most of this is unofficial and does not go into the accounts of 
the academic institute. Anecdotal evidence suggests some of the money goes to the 
patrons/owners of the school and some to the political party under whose watch the 
school was formed. This has had a threefold consequence. It has helped the parties 
bestow largesse on key supporters while ensuring they also gain financial payoffs. It 
has also ensured the state produces a large number of engineering graduates 
compared to most other states. Interestingly one of the most frequent reasons 
provided by many software and engineering companies for investing in Tamil Nadu is 
the availability of skilled manpower. And Tamil Nadu has a high share of engineering 
graduates in the country. As Table 6.4 shows the computer software and hardware 
sectors was the second largest recipient of FDI in the state from 2000 to 2011. This 
resource pool was made available not because the parties consciously wanted to 
reap the benefits of higher education for the state but was an inadvertent 
consequence of a rent created for quite another purpose. This ties in with our 
framework which analyses how strategies for rent creation that are used to create 
strong patron-client networks also impact growth. 
 
 
Rank Sector FDI inflows in USD Share of FDI 
attracted in the 
sector (%) of all 
India total 
1 Construction development 
(townships, built up 
infrastructure etc) 
1,226.20 15.33 
2 Computer software and 
hardware 
1037.79 12.98 
3 Automobile industry 1025.85 12.83 
4 Drugs and pharmaceuticals 563.10 7.04 
5 Services sector 505.39 6.32 
                         Total 4358.33 54.5 
 
 
Table 6.4. Top five sectors in FDI equity inflow 2000-2011 
Source: Table 3.2 RBI Regional Office Chennai (RBI 2011)  
 
Apart from strong patron-client linkages within the parties Tamil Nadu is also known 
for its politicized but highly committed bureaucrats. Industrialists across the board 
rate them as one of the best along with bureaucrats from Gujarat and to a lesser 
extent Maharashtra. One of the frequent reasons cited for it is that Tamil Nadu has a 
better ‘work culture’ or ‘work ethic’. While not disputing the statement ascribing it 
merely to culture would be simplistic. A more political reason for this is at hand. At 
the time that the state was still ruled by the Congress (1950-67) there were also 
strong ministers at the centre from Tamil Nadu. Bureaucrats from the state 
interacted with key Tamil ministers in facilitating investments to the home state. It 
certainly helped that Madras was already one of India’s most industrialized cities 
thanks to British investments and Madras port was one of the largest in the country. 
But regular contact with senior ministers from their home state helped Tamil 
bureaucrats learn state craft faster. Tamil Nadu remained one of the higher 
recipients of industrial licences through the 1960s and 1970s. A deeper analysis of 
the state’s effective bureaucracy follows shortly. 
Leather and textile industrial clusters were established under Congress governments 
but have continued to turn in strong industrial performances under the non 
Congress governments too. Tamil Nadu’s power looms manufacturing cotton fabrics 
account for 30 per cent of India’s textile exports and the net value addition in the 
textile industry in the state is 37.5 per cent, the highest in the sector in the country. 
The state accounts for 65 per cent of the total number of spinning mills in the 
country and the Tirupur cluster produces 60 per cent of India’s knitwear. Tirupur is 
also one of India’s largest textile exporting hubs accounting for 90 per cent of its 
knitwear exports. The net value addition in Textile industry in Tamil Nadu is about 
37.5 per cent, the highest in the country. The Textile mills are concentrated in 
Coimbatore, Tirupur, Salem, Palladam, Karur and Erode. Tamil Nadu has around 
3,50,000 power looms manufacturing cotton fabrics and accounts for about 30 per 
cent of India's export of textiles products (Chellasamy and Karuppiah 2005). The 
Erode district in Tamil Nadu is well known for marketing of textile products of 
handloom, powerloom and readymade garments. The largest clusters are found 
around Coimbatore, Tirupur and Erode, cities in the west central region of the state 
as well as in Chennai. A measure of the success of the state in sustaining its textile 
sector can be gauged from the fact that first textile mill was set up in Coimbatore in 
1888 and the city now houses over 100 mills. The organized sector employs over 
200,000 workers in textile mills but the sector has a significant component of 
unorganized workers (Chellasamy and Karuppiah 2005). Trade unions and social 
activists frequently raise questions about the conditions of the labour force working 
in these industries and many are valid, especially environmental issues and the 
exploitative Sumangali scheme run by mills of the area under which Dalit and 
women from poorer families women are employed. The leather industry is another 
traditionally strong manufacturing sector in the state. Tamil Nadu is the leading 
leather exporting state in the country accounting for 47 per cent of the country’s 
exports in 2007. The state employs 42 per cent of the 2.5 million workers employed 
in the sector in India with clusters located around Chennai, Ambur, Ranipet, 
Vaniyambad  (NSDC 2008). It needs to be added here that given the employment 
and export potential of both these sectors the two have attracted technical and 
financial aid from central and state governments as well as overseas assistance and 
Tamil Nadu has been no exception. Given that both these sectors attract 
employment from some of the state’s relatively marginalized economic classes 
governments had tried to ensure these sectors receive enough financial attention. 
This does cut both ways though. While it does provide employment to backward 
classes it also provides mill owners with access to a pool of labour that has very little 
social or economic agency and hence allows some of the owners at least to get way 
with exploitative practices. 
 This strategy was unlike West Bengal where a Communist oriented coalition decided 
not to take advantage of the state’s high levels of industrialization and instead 
decided on building an agrarian constituency to keep themselves in power. The rent 
creation strategy of the Tamil parties involved industrialization and building of 
infrastructure like irrigation systems, along with the redistributive policies we have 
mentioned earlier. Bureaucrats then found it easier to act as facilitators between 
investors and the state, especially in organizations like TIDCO, the state’s industrial 
development corporation set up in 1965 that invests in joint ventures with the 
private sector and the State Industries Promotion Corporation of Tamil Nadu or 
SIPCOT set up in 1971 to facilitate term loans to industry. The state also set up the 
Guidance Bureau under the aegis of TIDCO in 1992 to make use of the opportunities 
presented by liberalization. The Bureau’s biggest success has been in attracting auto 
sector investments into Tamil Nadu, domestic and foreign. There was another 
reason why bureaucrats in Tamil Nadu were effective and that was their level of 
political commitment to the party they chose to identify with. A retired senior 
bureaucrat from Maharashtra told us that given the depth of the schism between 
the two political parties bureaucrats perforce had to choose which party to support. 
Being neutral was not seen to be a practical option though there were some who 
chose to stay above this divide. For those who did make the choice they came to be 
identified as belonging to a particular party and when that party was in power they 
therefore had to perform effectively enough. An indicator of this system was that in 
the early 1970s Tamil Nadu was one of the first states to agree to what became 
known as ‘committed bureaucracy’. This was a policy attributed to Indira Gandhi and 
her son Sanjay who envisaged a bureaucracy that would defer to what the elected 
politicians would want (since apparently that’s what the electorate wanted) and not 
question them unless the decision could be proven illegal. As a standard for 
bureaucratic credibility the idea was a complete reversal of Weber’s bureaucratic 
neutrality or even Evans’ ‘embedded autonomy’ and this policy is now credited with 
the steady decline in the quality of Indian bureaucracy. In the name of making way 
for the people’s wishes by deferring to their representatives this practice has 
actually led to bureaucrats abdicating better judgement to politicians and in fact 
went further to consolidate rent seeking. Yet Tamil Nadu adopted it fast enough 
because its bureaucrats were already implementing this system informally. Post 
liberalization the competition between the states ensured state administrations had 
to work harder to get investments and the Tamil Nadu bureaucracy was not found 
wanting in this matter. Its nodal agencies that facilitate industry, TIDCO, SIPCOT and 
Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation or TNIIC are known as some of the 
more effective bureaucratic agencies in India. This demonstrates that Tamil Nadu’s 
clientelist political settlement even included some members of the state’s 
bureaucracy. Given that both political parties were willing to encourage industrial 
investments and build links with capitalists the respective allegiances of the 
bureaucrats ensured relatively effective implementation of policy. 
 
6.6 The Political Settlement and Capability Development in Tamil Nadu  
As we discussed in our analytical framework in Chapter Three, the holding power of 
capitalists in a political settlement relative to the ruling coalition also has an effect 
on rent-allocation strategies and therefore on growth outcome. The power of the 
biggest business organizations relative to political organizations was growing in Tamil 
Nadu as in the rest of India but here because the political organizations were 
themselves not likely to be in power for very long, the capture of political 
organizations in inverted patron-client relationships of the type emerging in incipient 
form in Gujarat was less in evidence. It does not make sense for a big economic 
organization to invest heavily in a relationship with one political organization if that 
political organization has a life span of five years. This meant that a strategy of 
controlling long-term rent flows by building close relationships with a particular 
political organization was not a viable strategy in Tamil Nadu in the period under 
review. The best that economic organizations could expect would be upfront rents to 
make their investment more attractive. This had beneficial selection effects. It 
attracted economic organizations that were already competitive or close to 
competitiveness. These high capability business organizations also found pre-existing 
formal capabilities (educated workforce) and informal capabilities (industrial clusters 
and tacit knowledge) in Tamil Nadu that made the package attractive. The high levels 
of tacit knowledge of manufacturing processes in Tamil Nadu were in turn based on 
significant industrial development during the period of industrial policy and 
protection. As we can see from Table 5.3 in Chapter Five on Gujarat, by 1980 Tamil 
Nadu was already the fourth most industrially advanced state in India. 
The allocation of industrial licences to Tamil Nadu during the industrial policy period 
was very beneficial for attracting companies like Standard Motors and Ashok Leyland 
to Tamil Nadu, the latter eventually becoming one of India’s largest manufacturers 
of heavy commercial vehicles. Other companies that emerged in this period included 
MM Forgings which began life as a dealer for Royal Enfield motorcycles in 1946 but 
by 1974 had moved into the automotive forgings industry. Today the company is one 
of the leading manufacturers of various grades of steel forgings in India. The auto 
and auto component sector in Tamil Nadu developed to service the auto industry 
that located and developed in Tamil Nadu as a result of licence allocations. The TVS 
group is one of the best examples of this secondary development. The company has 
become one of India’s largest and most respected manufacturing corporations with 
interests in automobiles, auto components, auto dealerships and financing. It was 
worth USD 4 billion in 2012 and employed around 25,000 people. Companies within 
the TVS Group like Sundaram Clayton that manufactures air brakes, Sundaram Brake 
Linings, TVS Motor Company and Lucas TVS (a joint venture with Lucas UK) have won 
international quality standard prizes like the prestigious Deming Application Prize for 
excellence in manufacturing quality. Sundaram Clayton was the first Indian company 
to win the award. The Deming Prize is a coveted award for manufacturing companies 
initially awarded to recognize the best Japanese manufacturers. The Prize is now also 
awarded to non-Japanese companies and since then many Indian companies in the 
auto components sector have been recipients. A similar company also based in Tamil 
Nadu is the Rane group. The Group has four award winning companies Rane Brake, 
Rane Engine Valve, Rane Madras and Rane TRW Steering Systems. 
The two companies enjoyed similar growth trajectories. The TVS Group was founded 
by TV Sundaram Iyengar in 1911 and started operations as a bus fleet manager in 
rural Madras Presidency. From this Iyengar moved on to an auto dealership in 1945 
in Chennai. By the time of independence the business was a flourishing one and in 
1954 Indian Motor Parts and Accessories (IMPA) was incorporated as a distributor of 
automobile spare parts and accessories. In 1962 Brakes India was incorporated as a 
joint venture between TVS and Lucas of UK. By the 1970s TVS was a successful 
manufacturer of auto components supplying the auto belt gradually forming in the 
Chennai area. The company’s initial support came in the mid-1960s from R 
Venkataraman who was Minister of Industries in the central government and a 
Tamil, who enabled TVS to get land concessions around Chennai. The group is now is 
a global supplier for international auto companies. The Rane Group was established 
in 1928 as a distributor of auto parts. By 1959 it had diversified into the manufacture 
of valves for internal combustion engines. In 1975 it started manufacturing manual 
steering gears and today has a turnover of $3.75 billion. Other successful companies 
include Amalgamations which began as a spare parts dealership and became one of 
India’s most successful light engineering companies. Common to most of these 
companies especially the founders of the TVS Group and a tyre manufacturer called 
MRF were their links with successive Congress governments in the state. MRF’s 
founder Mammen Mappillai began with a balloon making factory near Chennai but 
MRF is today one of India’s largest automobile tyre manufacturers (Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). The growth of these auto components companies in and around 
Chennai explains why more than 35 percent of India’s auto components production 
comes from Tamil Nadu.  
The growth of the sector can be traced to policy induced rents as a result of 
decisions of the Indian Tariff Commission of 1957 that discouraged automobile and 
spare parts imports and promoted indigenization as part of a strategy of import 
substitution. Firms like TVS which were importing spare parts had enough technical 
knowledge and some ‘tacit knowledge’ to venture into manufacturing some spare 
parts themselves. Protection was one way of delivering rents to firms that were still 
not competitive in particular areas to engage in capability development processes 
including learning-by-doing. The limitations of India’s industrial policy particularly 
with respect to disciplining were discussed in Chapter Four. Nevertheless, even 
though India’s planning period did not create many globally competitive industries 
and sectors, it did create relatively high levels of technical and organizational 
capabilities in some areas that later achieved competitiveness in the 1980s (Khan 
2009b).  
The auto component sector in Tamil Nadu clearly gained from protection as new 
firms were set up and new capabilities were developed (Tewari 2001; Aya and 
Siddharthan 2007). Companies like TVS started operations in the Padi industrial 
cluster close to Chennai in 1960 as a beneficiary of protection. Today the industrial 
cluster is one of the leading industrial hubs in Tamil Nadu housing many companies 
beyond the TVS group of companies. Most other auto and auto components 
companies in the state are also clustered around Chennai making it the biggest auto 
cluster in India along with the National Capital Region (NCR) near Delhi and the 
Pune-Pimpri-Chinchwad area in Maharashtra. By the time the economy opened up in 
1991 the Chennai auto cluster was significant enough to attract the attention of 
international manufacturers like Ford and Hyundai and later Honda. Even after 
liberalization began in 1991, the Indian government maintained a 70 per cent 
localization rule in the 1990s in automobile production. This helped Indian auto 
component manufacturers to develop their capabilities as the localization rule 
provided implicit rents to domestic manufacturers to finance a period of learning 
and prepare to face competition from OEM component producers like Visteon and 
Delphi brought in by international car makers. For a time, foreign car makers had to 
source a significant amount of components from Indian component manufacturers 
even if they had not yet met price and quality conditions and this is the implicit rent 
allocation that financed their learning in the critical period of the 1980s and 1990s. 
The policy instrument that directed these temporary rents to auto component 
producers, the localization rule, was one that could be effectively enforced in this 
political settlement because no powerful organizations in the Indian political 
settlement could easily benefit by distorting the enforcement of this rule.  
Even though the localization requirement could no longer be used in the 2000s after 
India joined the WTO in 1995, by 2005 Indian auto component makers comprised 70 
percent of the supplier base of manufacturers like Hyundai India. The Hyundai plant 
near Chennai is now Hyundai’s global export base for small cars. Clearly by the 2000s 
Indian component producers had built enough capability to supply international auto 
producers. Even though Ford still sources some key components internationally it is 
also using the Chennai cluster as part of its global sourcing base. The years of 
capability building have paid off with an auto and auto components manufacturing 
base developing around Chennai (Figure 6.4). Net sales of the auto industry in the 
state have sustained steady growth in the 2000s (IBEF and ICRA 2008). Unlike other 
Indian states like West Bengal or Uttar Pradesh the state government in Tamil Nadu 
seldom faced protests against land acquisition for industry. This is largely because 
opposition to land acquisition has not been the focus of mass political mobilizations 
in a state where the growth of factory employment is widely supported as a 
mechanism for economic mobility.  
 
  Figure 6.4 Chennai’s share of the auto component sector in India 
Source: Mahindra World City SEZ presentation, 
http://www.mahindraworldcity.com/docs/chennai/tamilnadu.pdf 
 
Note: Figures in percentages 
Dr & Tr : Drive and Transmission 
Susp & Brk : Suspension and Brakes 
 
The Tamil Nadu experience with autos demonstrates that if a sector is near the 
global competitiveness frontier, and if policy instruments can deliver some limited 
rents for capability development, the entrance of foreign players need not 
necessarily spell doom for local enterprise. However as Tewari points out, by the 
2000s, the competitive regime in the sector meant that new entrants in the small 
and medium tier 2 and tier 3 levels of the industry need support to improve their 
skills and productivity levels (Tewari 2001). The tier 1 companies benefited from a 
series of policy rents (protected markets followed by localization rules) that allowed 
them to invest in their capabilities. Companies making up the next two tiers do not 
have access to these types of rents any more, nor do they have the political clout to 
influence policy or lobby effectively. Yet it is this segment, of potentially high 
productivity SMEs that need to be supported to take the auto components sector in 
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Tamil Nadu to the next level. One option may be consolidation with tier 2 firms being 
bought out by their tier 1 customers. In the 2000s, some of the larger tier 1 
companies also lobbied the state government to provide assistance to their smaller 
suppliers (Tewari 2001). These pressures have not resulted in significant policy 
changes.  
Unfortunately, in the 2000s and beyond, ruling parties in Tamil Nadu have 
discovered much easier ways of generating rents for their political redistribution 
without the difficult task of calibrating rent allocation to industry to develop 
capabilities as a way of increasing access to growth-generated revenues. The 
growing weakness and complex composition of coalition governments in Delhi has 
made it easier for well-placed regional parties to access significant formal and 
informal rents as the price of supporting the coalition government in Delhi. The 
future negotiation of effective rent allocations for capability development in Tamil 
Nadu will depend on the strength of economic organizations in the state and how 
business-government relationships evolve, the performance of manufacturing in the 
absence of any capability-development strategy, and the persistence of alternative 
sources of rents that ruling parties in Tamil Nadu have been able to access.  
The evolution of the Indian political settlement in the 2010s has supported 
unprecedented levels of unproductive rent capture involving the allocation of 
resources like natural resources, land or telecom spectrum. We outlined in Chapter 
Four how this was related to the gradual exhaustion of productive profit-making 
options as sectors close to the competitiveness frontier became competitive and 
others were too far behind to benefit from the shrinking set of rent allocation 
instruments that were progressively available. At the same time the demands for 
political rent allocation kept growing as new social mobilizations led to the 
fragmentation of political organizations. Finally, powerful and cash-rich business 
organizations emerged that could offer quick and significant kickbacks to political 
organizations in exchange for allocations of land, natural resources or the spectrum, 
a process that is part of the phenomenon that we described as a reversal of the 
standard patron-client relationship between business and government.  
These processes have cut out productive capitalists from the same level of political 
influence and political organizations are taking less interest in ensuring the 
profitability of these enterprises as part of their long-term rent strategies for their 
own political reproduction. Our respondents in business and the bureaucracy 
confirm that the Tamil political parties that took a pro-industrial position in the 
1990s out of self interest display less urgency in tackling the constraints affecting 
industry and technological capability development in the 2010s.  Capitalists seeking 
to improve their productivity, quality and competitiveness are trapped between an 
indifferent ruling coalition and their own inability to offer direct and large informal 
payoffs to political organizations. Investors in states like Tamil Nadu and 
Maharashtra that have a larger proportion of high technology companies relative to 
the rest of India find themselves at a particular disadvantage because these sectors 
cannot deliver quick payoffs.  
On the other hand, the advantage that Tamil Nadu has over Gujarat is that a majority 
of its large companies especially in auto, auto components and electronics are in 
sectors that constantly need to strive to remain competitive. The compulsion to use 
rents to raise productivity and not capture them is built into the structure of their 
organizations. Their bargaining counter with political organizations is their ability to 
provide long term stability to the ruling coalition through employment generation, 
formal revenue generation through taxation and informal revenue generation for 
parties. Even if the kickbacks cannot be as large as those that can be offered by 
enterprises engaged in say natural resource rent capture or theft, they are 
sustainable over time. There is some evidence that industry in Tamil Nadu is 
beginning to realize it has enough holding power to nudge the government in this 
direction. In 2006 their lobbying resulted in the government of India launching the 
Indian Auto Mission Plan (IAMP) under which it seeks to build innovation 
architecture around programmes like the National Automotive Testing and R&D 
Infrastructure Project (NATRIP) which provides international standard testing and 
homologation (to attain standards for vehicular types) facilities for the Indian 
automobile industry. The IAMP Plan was to set up NATRIP centres in four regions of 
the country and the automobile and auto component manufacturers from Chennai 
were keen that the centre for south India was set up in Chennai. At that time the 
AIADMK government under Jayalalithaa had just come to power in the state and 
NATRIP was not a priority for her administration. However the industry lobbied and 
got her to write to the national ministry in New Delhi and the regional centre for the 
South was set up in Chennai, a boost to the sector’s attempts at increasing 
competitiveness. The NATRIP centre along with other industry-academia linkages 
through academic centres of excellence like the Indian Institute of Technology in 
Chennai are supporting the evolution of a high-tech automotive cluster around 
Chennai.  
The longer-term prognosis for Tamil Nadu depends on whether the two-party 
competitive clientelism system with informal institutional arrangements ensuring 
relatively longer time horizons is likely to endure. The main challenge to it comes 
from endogenous forces driving fragmentation, related to succession issues. Both 
the DMK and AIADMK, but more so the DMK, are dynastic parties where succession 
is based on family rather than internal elections. In DMK’s case the fight is between 
two half-brothers who are currently claiming to be the true inheritors of 
Karunanidhi’s legacy. Their sister, who was briefly in jail on corruption charges, is 
also emerging as another powerful political figure. Clientelist parties in India have 
frequently split when succession issues remained unresolved.  If the DMK moves in a 
similar direction the current two-party system will be upset and key features of the 
political settlement may change. The AIADMK faces a different challenge as 
Jayalalithaa does not have a family she can bequeath the leadership to nor has she 
identified any deputy who can take on the reins of the party at a later date. In our 
analysis, the smooth transfer of power between the two major parties has been 
important for ensuring formal and informal institutions support growth. This may 
change if the political parties become more fragmented and engage in more hostile 
contests that include disrupting previous contracts and rent allocations to business. 
If that were to happen, the growth-stability trade-off facing the enforcement of 
institutions that support even limited capability development may become more 
adverse, potentially affecting industrial growth in the state. In contrast to the 
personalised internal politics of clientelist parties, ‘ideological’ parties like the Left 
parties in India and the BJP, practice intra-party democracy to a greater extent. But 
as we have seen in our chapter on Gujarat, the construction of political dominance 
by ideological parties also has its costs.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Tamil Nadu has a higher share of all India industrial employment as well as a lower 
ICOR compared to Gujarat (comparing Table 5.1 and Table 6.1). Gujarat has a higher 
share of fixed capital investment and TFP in industry has grown faster in Gujarat than 
in Tamil Nadu (Kathuria, et al. 2010). These characteristics of industrial growth in the 
two states reflect the fact that Gujarat’s industrial growth has been more capital 
intensive and concentrated in sectors like petrochemicals while Tamil Nadu’s has 
been more broad based and dependent on capability development that achieved 
global competitiveness in sectors like automobiles and electronics. We have shown 
why these differences were not just related to differences in natural resource 
endowments, but more fundamentally reflected differences in the ways in which the 
political settlements were constructed and the formal and informal institutional 
support that was available for different patterns of industrialization.  
In Gujarat, the ruling coalition was almost always able to align with big business 
interests and under Modi this ability was enhanced by the creation of an 
authoritarian clientelism that allowed significant discretionary rent allocations to big 
business in capital-intensive sectors with significant returns. In Tamil Nadu its 
political settlement of competitive clientelism needed more redistributive, populist 
policies leading to a focus on welfare policies much earlier than in Gujarat and its 
manufacturing base was also in sectors with lower levels of concentration like 
textiles, leather and small and medium engineering. The search for revenues and the 
availability of significant economic capabilities allowed the development of 
enforceable rent management strategies in the 1990s that led to further capability 
development and growth in sectors like automobiles and electronics.  
The framework of political settlements allows us to shed light on the paradox of 
rapid growth of relatively high-technology sectors in a context marked by apparent 
political instability and high levels of corruption and clientelism. Far from developing 
despite these adverse conditions, we have argued that features of its competitive 
clientelism actually made possible some specific patterns of growth. We also 
identified and analysed the effectiveness of Tamil Nadu’s bureaucracy, moving 
beyond simplistic cultural explanations. Despite the fragmentation of the DMK into 
the AIADMK and later into further groups like the PMK and the MDMK, the period 
covered by our analysis saw two major parties successively forming the ruling 
coalition. The fact that all these groups owed allegiance to the ideology of the 
Dravida Kazagham has meant that the factional conflicts were restricted to in their 
scope and informal ‘live-and-let-live’ compromises could emerge. This was also 
helped by the fact that the parties appealed to the same or very similar 
constituencies. This led to the paradox that while the parties had to compete very 
intensely to mobilize their base and deliver to them, it also led to stability in policies 
and institutions that supported the productive industrial sectors. 
The policy challenge for Tamil Nadu is to devise growth strategies that take into 
account its competitive clientelism. This is likely to require a more pro-active role for 
the state’s productive capitalist class. Productive economic organizations in the state 
have a lot to lose if the growth-stability trade-off facing developmental institutions 
became more adverse. This constituency has already established relationships with 
both parties and their dealings with political organizations are not adversarial 
because everyone assumes that the two parties will each cycle in and out of power. 
But given the weakening incentives for developmental rent management, industry 
may have to put pressure on the ruling parties to support capability development 
with rent-creating policies and institutions.  
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